Marquette Law Review
Volume 33
Issue 1 May 1949

Article 12

Sales: Consummation of Sales in Self-Service
Stores
Harry E. Fryatt

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
Repository Citation
Harry E. Fryatt, Sales: Consummation of Sales in Self-Service Stores, 33 Marq. L. Rev. 71 (1949).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol33/iss1/12

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.

19491

RECENT DECISIONS

are sufficient to rule out collateral estoppel, and the case goes even
further than past cases, and says that an intervening clarification of
the law may be sufficient ground on which to base a reconsideration
of matters found in a prior case.
Another matter that has caused some trouble has been the finding
based on mixed fact and law. It has been held that while res judicata
(presumably meaning collateral estoppel) does not apply to a strict
question of law, where a fact, question or right is found by an erroneous application of the law, that finding is binding is a subsequent suit
between the same parties. 16 However, this would seem to be cleared
up by the Sunnen case, as all income transferor tax liability cases would
seem to involve mixed findings of fact and law. The injustice that
would be done by holding the parties to a finding based upon an erroneous application of the law, or upon law which is later changed or clarified by decision, is not hard to imagine, especially in income tax cases.
While authority is abundant that changes in the law, statutory and
decisional, would throw out the plea of res judicata or collateral estoppel in a later suit.- the liberal rule of the Sunnen case, that mere clarification of the law is sufficient to create a change in the "legal atmosphere", does not seem to have the same support in the cases, but it is
a rule that should prevent much injustice. The American Law Institute
would apparently go as far, however' s The res judicata and collateral
estoppel doctrines are based on a public policy, only, which attempts to
settle matters once litigated. A public policy as this will not be allowed
to prevent justice, by causing the perpetuation of an error in later suits
involving different claims.' 9
JAMES KIRSCHLING

Sales -

Consummation of Sales in Self-Service Stores -

Plaintiffs

entered the self-service store of the Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea
Company. The husband selected two bottles of ginger ale and proceeded to place them in his merchandise cart when one bottle exploded. A
piece of glass therefrom struck his wife in the leg causing her serious
injury. Defendants were engaged in the business of manufacturing and
bottling the ginger ale. This product was sold and delivered to the
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company for resale in its stores. Plaintiffs
based their action on assumpsit for breach of implied warranty of fitv. Moser, 266 U.S. 236, 45 S. Ct. 66, 69 L.Ed. 263 (1924). See also, Griswold, "Res Judicate in Federal Tax Cases," 56 Yale L.J. 1320, at pp. 1333,
1334, 1355, 1356, but see p. 1335 for cases contra (1937).
'1 State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co. v. Duel, 324 U.S. 154, 65 S. Ct. 573,
89 L.Ed. 812 (1945), and see fns. 5, 10, 11 and 14, supra.
3s American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law of judgments, sec. 70 (1942).
19 See fn. 18, supra, and also Henricksen v. Seward, 135 F. (2d) 986, 150 A.L.R.
1 (C.C.A. 9th, 1943).
16 U.S.
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ness and merchantibility. Held: no recovery in assumpsit against bottler
on ground of breach of implied warranty that the ginger ale and bottle
were fit and safe for storage and handling by store and store's employees and customers, since there was neither a sale nor an executory
contract of sale. Loch et ux. v. Confair et ux., 63 A. 2d 24, (Pennsylvania 1949).
The liability of a seller of goods, whether he is manufacturer or
producer of such goods, or is a retailer or other seller dealing in or
selling goods manufactured or produced by another, for personal injuries sustained by the buyer by reason of defect in or the condition
of the article sold may rest upon fraud in misrepresenting the character
of the goods sold, upon express or implied warranty of their quality
or condition, or upon negligence.'
The fraud in misrepresenting the character of the goods sold to be
actionable must consist, first, of a statement or fact which is untrue;
second, that it was made with intent to defraud and for the purpose of
inducing the other party to act upon it; third, that he did in fact rely
2
on it and was induced thereby to act to his injury or damage.
Ordinarily the mere happening of an accident is not evidence of
negligence. Where a purchaser took a bottle of "Coca Cola" from an
icing container and the bottle exploded in his hand, it was held that he
could not recover for negligence without showing a greater likelihood
that the mishap was occasioned by some act of negligence of the bottler
for which it was responsible rather than by a cause for which the manufacturer was not liable. 3 The court said there was no evidence that
would warrant a finding that the bottle was not properly constructed
or that it was not an appropriate vessel for the purpose for which it
was used. Evidence to sustain a cause of action based upon negligent
conduct is often difficult to obtain.
Recovery in the principal case was predicated on assumpsit for
breach of implied warranty. To assert a right based on breach of warranty the required elements of a contract must be present. 4 It has
been held that in self-service stores the store does nothing more than
make an offer to sell for cash at the prices marked on the goods. 5 Until
there is an acceptance of this offer by the buyer no contractual relation arises between the parties. The offer cannot be considered as
accepted before the goods reach the cashier and the store, before that
time, has not assummed any contractual obligation with the buyer.
146 Am. Jur. 926, Sales, sec. 800.
2

1nternational Milling Co. v. Priem, 179 Wis. 622, 192 N.W. 68 (1923).

3Ruffin v. Coca Cola Co., 311 Mass. 514, 42 N.E.(2d) 259 (1942).
4 Prinsen v. Russos, 194 Wis. 142, 215 N.W. 905 (1927).
5

Lasky v. Economy Grocery Stores, 319 Mass. 224, 65 N.E. (2d) 305, 163 A.L.R.
235 (1946).
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It is undisputed that the merchandise in a self-service store is the property of the store until paid for by a customer at the checking counter 0
An offer to sell imposes no obligation until it is accepted according
to its terms.7 Acceptance must be identical with the terms of the
proposal in order to complete the sale." Where the sale is a cash transaction, parties generally contemplate passage of title and right to
possession simultaneously with payment.9 Even though the buyer has
obtained possession of the goods, where it is a cash sale, there must be
payment in order to pass title as between the parties.10 The seller may,
however, waive any or all of these conditions and a valid sale will
result.
Plaintiffs, in the principal case, challenged the holding of the court
that the title to the bottles of ginger ale had not been transferred to
them at the time of the explosion. It was argued that title passed to
them immediately upon their having selected the bottles from the retailers shelves, subject to being revested in the retailer if restored to
the shelf by them prior to taking them to the cashier. Uniform Sales
Act, Section 19, rule 3 (1) was relied upon in support of this contention." But the court said this section must be read in conjunction with
2
Section 42 to derive its full application.'
Similarly, the proposed Uniform Revised Sales Act seems to support the court's construction that these sections must be applied together: "A sale on approval is a contract for sale under which the goods
delivered notwithstanding, such use by the buyer as is consistent with
their testing or trying out, are to remain the sellers until acceptance
by the buyer..... 13 "Under a sale on approval unless otherwise agreed
the goods are appropriated to the contract when identified but the risk
of loss and the title do not pass to the buyer until acceptance .... ,,14
oGargaro v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., 22 Tenn. App. 70, 118 S.W. (2d)
561 (1938).

7 California and Hawaiian Sugar Refining Corp. v. Mason By-Products Co.,

23 F.(2d) 436 (C.C.A. 9th 1928).

SAtlas Torpedo Co. v. U.S. Torpedo Co., 15 S.W.(2d) 150 (1929).
9 Calcara v. United States, 83 F.(2d) 767 (C.C.A. 8th 1931).
10Long v. Dye, 42 Ga. App. 726, 157 S.E. 359 (1931).
"Uniform Sales Act. sec. 19, rule 3 (1).
"When goods are delivered to the buyer 'on sale or return,' or on other terms
indicating an intention to make a present sale, but to give the buyer an option
to return the goods instead of paying the price, the property passes to the
buyer on delivery, but he may revest the property in the seller by returning
or tendering the goods within the time fixed in the contract, or, if no time
has been fixed, within a reasonable time."
'2 bid, sec. 42.
"Unless otherwise agreed, delivery of the goods and payment of the price are
concurrent conditions; that is to say, the seller must be ready and willing to
give possession of the goods to the buyer in exchange for the price, and the
buyer must be ready and willing to pay the price in exchange for possession
of the goods."
'3 Proposed Uniform Revisdd Sales Act sec. 50(1).
14 Ibid, sec. 5 (1) (a).
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"Tender of delivery is a condition to the buyer's duty to accept the
goods and, unless otherwise agreed, to his duty to pay for them. When
duly made, tender entitles the seller to acceptance and to payment
according to the contract."'15 "Where payment is due and demanded
on the delivery to the buyer of goods or documents of title, his right
as against the seller to retain or dispose of them is conditional upon his
making the payment due."' 0
The other leading case on self-service stores corroborates this contention quite succinctly:
"It is true that customers were invited to take possession of the
goods that they intended to purchase and, if such possession may
be considered the equivalent of delivery of the bottle, such delivery was conditional and was made only for the purpose of
permitting the customer to take it to the cashier. Possession
alone was not in these circumstances sufficient to pass title.'7
The quesion of privity of warranty was not raised in the principal
case. There is authority to the effect that manufacturers and bottlers
of beverages may be held liable to consumers who purchased from in8
termediate dealers.'
HARRY E. FRYATT

Torts-Duty of Municipality to Erect Warning Signs at Curve in
Highway - Plaintiff passenger in a car driven by one Schreck was
proceeding eastward at 3:30 A.M. on a July morning over a street on
which residences were within five hundred feet of one another. It was
foggy and the car proceeded at between twenty and thirty-five miles
per hour. The eighteen foot wide macadam street with one and one
half foot gravel shoulders made a right angle turn to the North; a series
of twelve three foot white topped guard posts five feet apart marked
the outside of the curve. At the curve the travelled way, i.e. the
macadam and gravel shoulders, increased to a twenty-two foot width.
Schreck, when he perceived the white topped posts in front of him,
applied his brakes and after skidding fifty-one feet around the curve
collided with a tree at a point twenty-three inches east of the traveled
way. The tree was fourteen inches in diameter and over twenty feet
high. Plaintiff alleged liability under section 81.15 of the statutes for
an insufficiency and want of repair of a public highway due to an
absence of warning signs to indicate existence of the curve and the
proximity of the tree to the traveled way. There was no allegation of
insufficiency in construction or repair of the macadam surface. Held:
15Ibid, sec. 76(1).
16Ibid, sec. 76(2).
17 Supra, note 5.
18 17 A.L.R. 696.

